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A REJOINDER
Larry I. Palmer
Professor Strouse assumes throughout his reply that the goal of our
legislative recommendations was to better define "parental rights and
responsibilities."' Second, he assumes that the New York Surrogate Act was
"unfortunately worded" because it did not resolve the issue of the parental
status of "genetic mothers." 2 Third, Strouse assumes in his critique of our
recommendation favoring genetic mothers for estates and trusts purposes that
the word "parent" should have the same definition in all legal settings.3 I
hope my brief comments on his three assumptions will amplify the differ-
ences in our approaches to legal responses to technological innovations.
First, as we devised legislation regarding in vitro fertilization we
assumed the first question in law is, who is a parent. This is not a matter of
rights, but rather a matter of determining if a person meets the law's
definition for parental status. When several individuals perceive themselves
to be "parents" of another human being, legislators must devise means of
resolving those conflicts about parental status that the parties themselves
cannot resolve. In framing the legislative issue in terms of parental status,
we were cautioning courts not to engage in a "best interests of the child"
analysis when surrogate arrangements fail without a prior determination of
the parents of the child.
1. Daniel S. Strouse, Egg Donation, Motherhood and State Law Reform: A
Commentary on Professor Palmer's Proposals, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 31 (1994)
(emphasis added).
2. Id. at 36 n.21.
3. Id. at 46.
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Questions about who are parents in legal processes are institutional
questions about family formation. In choosing to treat in vitro fertilization
and artificial insemination as the same for legislative purposes, I was
influenced by my view of legislative capacity or institutional competence,
which I apologize for not making more explicit in my piece. As to those
types of questions, I believe that the legislature should have a minimalist role
in order to give private individuals the maximum opportunity to make their
private arrangements about family matters.4 Thus, the most important aspect
of our decision not to deal with issues related to single women is that the
legislature should not seek to regulate a single woman's access to or use of
in vitro fertilization (or of artificial insemination for that matter).
Anecdotal evidence suggests that some single women who live below
90th Street in Manhattan or in locales with similar demographics are using
artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization. Given my view of the relative
legislative incompetence to deal with family formation,' I recommend
simply leaving these single women and their collaborators in family
formation alone rather than inquiring into their circumstances or their
relationships to others for the purpose of defining their "statutory rights."
With such statutory rights analysis comes the possibility of imposing
obligations to children by state officials-judges-without regard to an
individual woman's present, past, or future intent or wishes. This is the
essence of legal parental status. We chose to place our statutory recommen-
dations on in vitro fertilization in the sections that deal with support
obligations when parties who agreed to marry or conceive children are trying
to dissolve their legal relationships in order to emphasize that status
implications drove our legislative proposals. To restate my first point:
Professor Strouse is concerned about the "rights" of egg donors, sperm
donors, etc. I am concerned with the issue of upon whom should the
legislature confer the legal status of parent with its concomitant obligations,
when intentions and actions of adults diverge.
When Professor Strouse assumes the New York Surrogate Parenting
Act was "unfortunately drafted" in regard to the parental status of genetic
mothers, I assume the legislature simply could not reach a majority
4. See generally LARRY I. PALMER, LAW, MEDICINE, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
(1989).
5. This is a very incomplete form of "comparative institutional analysis" of the
political process, the adjudicative process, and the "market," i.e., those private
individuals who choose to have children either coitally or with the assistance of
medical professionals through the use of in vitro fertilization. Professor Neil Komesar
has been a long-time advocate of this type of institutional analysis of public policy
issues. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS
IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994).
35 JURIMETRICS JOURNAL
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consensus about their parental status. Professor Strouse is thus correct in
stating that I made a conscious effort to avoid what he calls a "difficult value
choice" between the genetic mother and the gestational mother. I believe
some value choices should not be resolved within a democratically construct-
ed process, particularly when those choices involve the institution of family
and its formation. All claims-of those who contribute genetic materials
(men and women) to creating children as well as of those who provide
gestational birth-are equally powerful and entitled to respect in the
legislative process. Put more bluntly, when it comes to deeply intimate
matters such as the meaning of our lives and our connection to the future
through those we call "children," I believe the legislature can provide only
a structure, and perhaps some incentives or disincentives, but not the detailed
code of regulations suggested by Professor Strouse.6
The New York Surrogate Parenting Act provides some structure,
incentives, and disincentives. The legislature provided conscientious lawyers
with an incentive to stop representing to potential users of surrogacy ar-
rangements that their written agreements would be enforced by courts in
New York State. It provided a further incentive for these lawyers to advise
parties to use adoption after the birth of the child. In my view, the legislators
are not so naive as to think some surrogate arrangements might not still be
made in New York or that some New Yorkers, with the means, will not
travel to California for embryo donation. A declaration of public poli-
cy-which is what the New York Surrogate Parenting Act is at its core-is
only a structure for lawyer, physician, and private person decision-making.
It also includes a few disincentives, such as possible felony conviction for
surrogate brokers who are found to have taken fees more than once.7
Third, we recommended establishing a rule of certainty favoring the
genetic mother in wealth transfers because the word "parent" can have
different meanings in different legislative contexts where the social
consequences of the definition are different. The public policy question
involved in devising legal rules about who is the parent for the purpose of
giving away money is driven primarily by the social goal of efficient
allocation of resources. Where lawyers are normally engaged with clients in
6. See, e.g., Strouse, supra note 1, at 46.
7. It is worth noting that the only persons subject to a criminal penalty under the
New York Statute are those who take fees for their services in connection with
surrogate arrangements more than once. Brokers who are found to have violated the
specific prohibitions of offering the brokerage services for a fee are guilty of a felony
if previously convicted of violating the prohibitions. § 123(2)(b). On the other hand,
the private parties-the birth mother, genetic mother, etc.-are only subject to a civil
penalty of up to $500 for violating the statute. § 123(2)(a).
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planning the transfer of wealth, either rule-favoring gestational or genetic
mothers-would further efficiency goals. The reasons for choosing a legal
definition of parents in family formation, however, are based on attempts to
achieve some complex social goals other than efficiency.8 Except in
adoption cases, these social goals are intermixed with a variety of individual
goals and are achieved by individual agreements without lawyers. I would
prefer that people decide to have or not have children without counseling
from their lawyers. Such "planning" allows the decision to be in accordance
with their own values. My goal is not to define all the rules for in vitro
fertilization. My goal is much more modest: to affirm legislatively that in
vitro fertilization processes can give individuals the status of parents in law.
Professor Strouse may have grandiose goals for the legislative process
when he raises the possibility that any legislation that inhibits in vitro
fertilization may be unconstitutional.9 I disagree with his suggestion that the
New York Statute on Surrogate Parenting Contracts is outside the authority
of a state legislature to enact. But this is not the place either to outline a
counter argument to Professor Strouse or Professor John Robertson, the
leading proponent of "procreative liberty.""0 If we take seriously the
institutional role of legislatures in helping us to resolve the ethical issues of
family formation, we could then better address the comparative advantages
and disadvantages of employing legislative, adjudicative, and administrative
processes to assist individuals in forming families. When we are finished
with all the "rights analysis" that Professor Strouse's approach suggests, I
wonder if we will have better institutions: families that can nurture and
sustain children until they are adults; legislatures that can respond to the
benefits and risks of technological innovation; administrative agencies able
to promote the socially constructive use of scientific processes; and courts
able to articulate their role in making democratic processes, within a
complex, imperfect, and pluralistic society, marginally better.
8. See Konesar, supra note 5, at 14-50.
9. Strouse, supra note 1, at 40.
10. JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1994).
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